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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kevin Donald Cheatham appeals from the district court's order denying
his motion to modify the term of his probation that prohibits him from possessing
a firearm or residing in a home where firearms are present.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Cheatham with grand theft by possession of stolen
property.

(R., pp.23-24, 42-43.) Cheatham pied guilty to the charged offense

and the court imposed a unified five-year sentence with three years fixed, but
suspended the sentence and placed Cheatham on supervised probation for two
years. (R., pp.44, 50-53.) More than six months later, Cheatham filed a "Motion
to Amend Judgment" in which he asked the court to eliminate the condition,
imposed by his probation officer, that he not possess firearms or reside in a
home where firearms are present. (R., pp.61-62.) The court denied the motion
and Cheatham filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.92-100.)
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ISSUES

Cheatham states the issues on appeal as:

I.

Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to amend the
probation condition contained in the judgment.

II.

Whether the District Court properly reviewed the rule
imposed by Probation and Parole as an agency action.

111.

Whether a person convicted of Grand Theft may as a
condition of probation be prohibited from possessing a
firearm.

IV.

Whether the defendant may be prohibited from living in a
dwelling with his family where a firearm is kept.

V.

Whether the Idaho Department of Corrections may prohibit
the defendant from living in a residence where a firearm is
kept by another person in a secured location the probationer
has no access to because the owner of the firearm is not a
member of law enforcement.

(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows:
Has Cheatham failed to establish reversible error in the district court's
denial of his motion to amend the terms of Cheatham's probation?
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ARGUMENT
Cheatham Has Failed To Establish The District Court Committed Reversible
Error In Denying Cheatham's Motion To Modify The Firearm Condition Of His
Probation
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Cheatham's request to modify the term of

probation that prohibits Cheatham from possessing a firearm or residing in a
home where firearms are present. (R., pp.92-97.) Cheatham argues that the
district court erred because, he asserts: (1) the court applied an incorrect legal
standard, and (2) the firearm condition of his probation is unconstitutional.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-15.) Cheatham claims the condition is unconstitutional
because, he argues, it violates his "right to bear arms, that banished him from his
family's home, and that was patently in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts
shows Cheatham's constitutional arguments are meritless.

Cheatham has,

therefore, failed to establish reversible error in the district court's order denying
Cheatham's request to modify the firearm condition of his probation.

B.

Standard of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding upon the terms of

probation. State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452,454,566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1977).
However,
[t]he court's discretion to impose a term or condition is bounded by
whether the term or condition of probation is reasonably related to
the purpose of probation, namely rehabilitation. State v. Mummert,
98 Idaho 452, 454, 566 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1997). The "reasonable
relationship" is the legal standard by which the validity of a term or
3

condition must be judged. . . . Whether the terms or conditions
meet the legal standard is a question of law, see Mummert, 98
Idaho at 454, 566 P.2d at 1112, over which [the appellate courts]
exercise free review. See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 121 Idaho 376,
378, 825 P.2d 99, 101 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho
319,321,824 P.2d 894,896 (Ct. App. 1991).
State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

The Firearm Condition Of Cheatham's Probation Does Not Violate Any Of
Cheatham's Constitutional Rights
Idaho law authorizes a sentencing court to place a defendant convicted of

a crime on probation subject to "such terms and conditions as it deems
necessary and appropriate," I.C. § 19-2601 (2), and the court may "modify any
conditions of probation" at any time, I.C. § 20-221 (1 ). The board of correction is
responsible for supervising probationers. I.C. § 20-219(1 )(a). Included among
the terms of probation in Cheatham's case is that he "be placed on a level of
supervision to be deemed appropriate by the Department of Corrections," that he
"follow all rules and regulations as directed by [his] probation officer," and that he
"sign a Probation Agreement."

(R., p.51.)

In accordance with this term,

Cheatham signed a probation agreement in which he agreed to the following
condition:

Firearms or Weapons: The defendant shall not purchase, carry,
possess or have control of any firearms, chemical weapons,
electronic weapons, explosives or other dangerous weapons.
Other dangerous weapons may include, but are not limited to,
knives with blades over two and one half inches (2 W') in length;
switch-blades; knives; brass knuckles; swords; throwing stars; and
other martial arts weapons. Any weapons or firearms seized will be
forfeited to IDOC for disposal. The defendant shall not reside in
any location that contains firearms unless the firearms are secured
and this portion of the rule is exempted in writing by the district
manager.
4

(Exhibit A (Idaho Department of Correction Standard Agreement of Supervision);
see Tr., p.21, Ls.12-25 (testimony that Cheatham signed such an agreement).)
Because of the foregoing condition, and because Cheatham lived with his
parents, Cheatham's father moved his eleven guns to a friend's house. (Tr., p.6,
L.20 - p.7, L.4.) Cheatham, however, asked the court to amend the condition,
contending (1) the crime he pied guilty to is "not a violent crime and does not ban
him from owning firearms after probation is over"; (2) the requirement is "patently
overbroad"; and (3) the condition violates his constitutional rights. (R., pp.61-76.)
The district court denied Cheatham's motion. (R., pp.92-97.)
On appeal, Cheatham first contends that the district court "correctly
understood that it had jurisdiction over the terms of [his] probation," but
incorrectly "reviewed the condition imposed by probation as an agency action
under I.C. § 67-5279."

(Appellant's Brief, pp.4-5.)

Cheatham then asks this

Court to "reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions to consider
the legality of the condition imposed by probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) This
Court should decline to do so because the district court did "consider the legality
of the condition" and, regardless of the standard applied by the district court,
whether a term or condition of probation is legal is a question of law over which
this Court exercises free review. Jones, 123 Idaho at 318, 847 P.2d at 1179.
In considering Cheatham's request to amend, the district court correctly
recited the following relevant legal standards:

5

Under Idaho Code Section 19-2601 a trial court has broad
discretion when imposing terms of probation that restrict a
defendant's liberty. I.C. § 19-2601; State v. Davis, 107 Idaho 215,
217, 687 P2d 998, 1000 (Ct. App. 1984). The statute's language is
meant to give the court maximum flexibility to fashion probation that
is most appropriate for the individual defendant. State v. Gonzales,
144 Idaho 775, 780, 171 P.3d 266, 271 (Ct. App. 2007)[,] citing
State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807, 87 P.3d 291, 294 (2004). As
part of probation, the court may restrict a defendant's "right to
travel, to change jobs or residences, or even to marry." Davis, 107
Idaho at 217, 687 P.2d at 998. Likewise, it is also well recognized
that a felon's right to bear arms may be restricted as part of
probation. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27, 128 S.Ct. 2783,
2817, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). The purpose of these restrictions
and probation is to rehabilitate the defendant under proper control
and supeNision. Davis, 107 Idaho at 217,687 P.2d at 998.
"However, the terms of probation must be reasonably related
to the purpose of rehabilitation." Davis, 107 Idaho at 217, 687 P.2d
at 998[,] citing State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 566 P.2d 1110
(1977).
(R., pp.94-95.)
After reciting the foregoing standards, the court continued:
In this case the Court placed the restriction at issue on
Defendant because it's a standard part of the probation agreement,
which is overseen by Probation and Parole, a division of the Idaho
Department of Corrections. Idaho Admin. [R]. 11.11.04. The
Department of Corrections is an administrative agency, and, thus,
the Court affords its actions a strong presumption of validity. Id.;
Duncan v. State Bd. of Accountancy, 149 Idaho 1, 3, 232 P.3d 322,
324 (2010). As such, the Court will only reverse the agency's
action if that action is found to be "(a) in violation of constitution or
statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the
agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; or (d) arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion." I.C. § 67-5279.
Here the standard probation agreement does not fit into any
of the above categories. If it were to fit into any of them, it would
be the last one. "An action is capricious if it was done without a
rational basis. It is arbitrary if it was done in disregard of the facts
and circumstances presented or without adequate determining
principles." Am. Lung Ass'n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep't of
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Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006) (citations
omitted).
(R., p.95.)

The district court then "look[ed] at the facts at hand," and found "the
condition that [Cheatham] live in a residence without firearms" was not "arbitrary
and capricious" because Cheatham had "control of the residence for long
uninterrupted periods."

(R., p.95.)

"As a result," the district court found the

restriction as "rational" and "related to the specific facts and circumstances of
this case." (R., p.95.)
The state agrees that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard the district
court applied was incorrect because the district court has ultimate authority over
the terms and conditions of probation, I.C. § 19-2601 (2), and the Department of
Correction's standard terms of supervision does not constitute agency action
subject to judicial review. See Gibson v. Ada County Sheriff's Dept., 139 Idaho
5, 7, 72 P.3d 845, 847 (2003) (noting "IAPA and its judicial review standards
apply to agency actions" but, under I.C. § 67-5201(2), "the state board of
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correction" is not included in the definition of "agency"). 1 It is unclear from the
record, however, whether the district court, in considering factors relevant to
review of agency action, disregarded the applicable standard despite its
discussion of that standard, and concluded that the firearm restriction was not
reasonably related to the purpose of probation but decided it could not modify
the condition absent a finding that it was arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless,
this Court need not parse through the language of the district court's decision
and divine what the court meant because, ultimately, whether the condition is

1

It appears the district court may have engaged in this line of analysis because
Cheatham questioned the district manager at the hearing on his motion about
whether the Department's standard agreement was a "rule that was promulgated
through IDAPA" (Tr., p.23, Ls.1-6), and, in his post-hearing brief, asserted:
Thus, this Court comes to the actual implementation of the
"rule" contained in the probation agreement to this matter. First, it
must be said that no such "rule" has ever been promulgated
according to IDAPA, nor does it even appear in the various policies
available on the Department's website. However, while the rule
clearly impinges on the defendant's constitutional rights, it does so
under the authority of this Court, and thus likely does not need to
pass any administrative hurdles. Rather, it must simply comply
with the limits of this Court's power.
(R., p.74).
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unconstitutional, as Cheatham contends, is a question of law reviewed de novo. 2
Jones, 123 Idaho at 318,847 P.2d at 1179; see also State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho
215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999) (citations and quotations omitted) ("this
Court exercises free

review over questions of law,

including whether

"constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found").
Remand is therefore unnecessary.
Cheatham raises three constitutional challenges to the firearm condition
of his probation; all three challenges are without merit. First, Cheatham argues
that the firearm condition violates his right to possess a firearm under the Idaho
Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
violates his right to self-defense.
specious.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.)

This claim is

The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that

"longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" does not
violate the Constitution, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008),
and Cheatham cites no authority for the proposition that Idaho's state
constitutional right to possess a firearm cannot be limited by similar prohibitions
(see generally Appellant's Brief, p.8-11).

2

In fact, the state constitutional

Although Cheatham notes the requirement that a "condition of probation must
be reasonably related to the purpose of probation" (Appellant's Brief, p.8), he
does not claim that the firearm condition he sought to have modified does not
satisfy this standard (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-15).
Instead,
Cheatham argues the condition is unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-15.)
Thus, although the state submits the condition satisfied the "reasonably related"
standard, this Court need not address that issue because Cheatham has not
claimed otherwise. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718
(2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)
(noting an issue will not be considered if "either authority or argument is
lacking").
9

provisions Cheatham does cite expressly provide that the right to "keep and bear
arms" "shall not prevent the passage of laws" that govern, among other things,
"penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon."

(Appellant's

Brief, p.10 (quoting Idaho Const., art. I,§ 11).) Because Cheatham currently has
no right to possess a firearm, the firearm condition of his probation is not
unconstitutional. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
Cheatham's second constitutional claim is that, even "assuming" he "can
be barred from possessing firearms, the next question presented in this matter is
whether he can be forced from his home because another person he lives with
possesses a firearm." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) According to Cheatham, this is
"banishment" that "treads upon constitutional guarantees."

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.11-12.) This claim fails factually and legally. As a matter of fact, Cheatham
has not been "banished" from anywhere. Cheatham accepted, as a condition of
probation, that he not "reside in any location that contains firearms." (See Exhibit
A) In accordance with that term, and to facilitate Cheatham's ability to live with

him, Cheatham's father removed his firearms from his house. (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-4
"Right now [the guns] are at our friend's home just to comply with terms of
probation.").)

Any implication that Cheatham has been "banished" from "his"

home is belied by the record.
As a matter of law, the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1932), the case upon which Cheatham relies, does not
support Cheatham's "banishment" argument.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) In

Moore, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of an ordinance that
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"limit[ed] occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family" and
"contain[ed] an unusual and complicated definitional section that recognize[d] as
a 'family' only a few categories of related individuals." 431 U.S. at 495-496. The
Court found the ordinance unconstitutional, concluding the Constitution does not
allow the government to "standardiz[e] its children and its adults by forcing all to
live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."

kl

at 506. Nowhere in Moore

did the Supreme Court hold that a court could not restrict where a probationer
lives and it is well-established in this state that such restrictions are permissible.
State v. Davis, 107 Idaho 215, 217, 687 P.2d 998, 1000 (Ct. App. 1984) (citation
omitted) ("As a condition of granting freedom to a probationer, society has the
right to impose stringent limitations on behavior. This may include restrictions on
important liberties, such as the right to travel, to change jobs or residences, or
even to marry."). The Supreme Court's reference to "family values" as a basis
for invalidating an ordinance that had nothing to do with probation falls far short
of establishing that a condition of probation that prevents a defendant from living
in a home where firearms are present is unconstitutional.
Cheatham's third and final constitutional challenge is based on the Equal
Protection Clause.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-15.)

This argument is premised

upon the portion of the firearm condition, as set forth in the Standard Agreement
of Supervision, that allows the district manager to make an exception to the
condition.

(Exhibit A.) At the hearing on Cheatham's motion, Donald Kiehl, a

district manager for the Idaho Department of Correction, testified that "there are
some exceptions that are made, primarily with a household that has a current
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law enforcement officer ... living in the home." (Tr., p.16, L.23- p.17, L.12.)
From this, Cheatham constructs an equal protection argument in which he
asserts: "This Court may not hold that a police officer's need to have a firearm in
the residence somehow outweighs a citizen's right to a firearm." (Appellant's
Brief, p.14.) Phrased differently, Cheatham contends "the only question is: why
is everyone safer if [Cheatham's father,] Steven Cheatham is a police officer, as
opposed to a cement worker?" 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Although Cheatham
acknowledges he cannot "stand on his father's rights," he contends he "can claim
that his right to live with his parents and take care of his mother is being violated
because the Department's rule unconstitutionally discriminates between himself
and other similarly situated probationers." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

However

Cheatham wishes to frame his equal protection argument, it fails.
"'The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike."' State v. Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307, 316, 324 P.3d 1006,
1015 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). '"Equal protection issues focus on classifications within
statutory schemes that allocate benefits or burdens differently among the
categories of persons affected."'

Hamlin, 156 Idaho at 316, 324 P.3 at 1015

(quoting In re Bermudes, 141 Idaho 157, 160, 106 P.3d 1123, 1126 (2005)).

3

Steven Cheatham testified that he works at Interstate Concrete & Asphalt. (Tr.,
p.9, Ls.8-9.)
12

When evaluating a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, this Court engages
in a three-step analysis: first, the Court must "identify the classification that is
being challenged;" second, the Court "determine[s] the standard under which the
classification will be judicially reviewed;" and third, the Court must "decide
whether the appropriate standard has been satisfied."

kl

"Therefore, in order

for [Cheatham] to prevail [on his Equal Protection claim,] he would be required to
show that he, by virtue of some classification, is being treated differently than a
person who does not share that classification." Hamlin, 150 Idaho at 316, 324
P.3d at 1015.
The Department's standard supervision agreement that allows for an
exception to the firearm condition is not a statutory scheme based on any
classification. Nor is Cheatham's argument actually based on "similarly situated
probationers," as he claims.

(Appellant's Brief, p.15.)

A "similarly situated

probationer" to Cheatham would be a probationer that does not live with
someone in law enforcement, not a probationer that lives with a member of law
enforcement. Even then, there is no blanket exception for law enforcement in
either the standard agreement or as a matter of policy. While Mr. Kiehl testified
that he has not denied the exception where the probationer lives with a member
of law enforcement in the "couple dozen" times he has been asked to make the
exception in his "seven or eight years" as a district manager (Tr., p.23, L.13 p.24, L.5), he did not testify that the exception would always be granted under
those circumstances. To the contrary, Mr. Kiehl testified that the probationer's
crime of conviction is also taken into consideration. (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-16.)
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Even if the factual underpinnings of Cheatham's equal protection
argument warranted consideration under an equal protection analysis, Cheatham
has made no effort to establish a violation under the applicable framework
because he has not identified what standard he thinks would apply to the alleged
suspect classification nor explained why a distinction based on living with a law
enforcement officer would not pass constitutional muster.

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.14-15.) Ultimately, Cheatham's only argument is that he believes he has a
constitutional right to live with his parents and take care of his mother. No such
right exists and no viable equal protection argument has been identified.
Cheatham has failed to establish any constitutional defect in the firearm
condition of his probation or any other basis for remanding this case.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
decision denying Cheatham's motion to amend his conditions of probation.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015.

eputy Attorney General
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